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RATIONAL ILLOGICALITY 
 
J. Robert G. Williams 
 
University of Leeds 
 
Abstract 
Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the 
problem case of clear-eyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does 
not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism. 
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1.! The Puzzle  
The liar sentence L says: L is not true. We reason:  
 
1.! L ∨ ÂL   (premise) 
2.! if L, then L & ÂL      (basic logic + the T-scheme)  
3.! if ÂL, then L & ÂL    (basic logic + the T-scheme) 
4.! L & ÂL.                    (argument by cases from 1,2,3). 
 
Rationality apparently requires that we be fully confident in tautologies like (1), that we utterly 
reject contradictions like (4), but that we do not allow our confidence to drop over a valid 
argument like the one from (1) to (4). These are incompatible demands. Something has to give.
1
  
 But what? Opinions vary, but I focus on two. Ada says the argument shows us that 
classical logic must be given up, and in particular, that (1) is no tautology. Rejecting (4), and 
mindful that we shouldnÕt have more confidence in the premise of a valid argument than in its 
conclusion, we must also reject (1). Beth says that we should continue to be fully confident in (1) 
and to fully reject (4), and somehow find fault with the argument. She notes that the reasoning 
essentially depends on the T-schemeÑthat L is true iff L. She rejects this assumption, and 
defends her view as a form of logical conservatism, by noting that this scheme is not strictly 
speaking part of classical logic as it appears in the textbooks.
2
 
 You listen to Ada and Beth's case for their positions, and see force on both sides. You are 
convinced that one is right, but are not sure which. You adopt the modest, reasonable hedged 
position on which you are agnostic about the propositions over which they disagree. In 
particular, while Ada utterly rejects L ∨ ÂL (thinking that it entails a contradiction) and Beth 
fully accepts it (thinking that it is a tautology), you have 0.5 confidence in it.  
                                                
1
 Nothing particularly hangs on my choice of the Liar as a hook here. Almost any debate which involves competing 
philosophical (or indeed scientific) theories embedding rival logics can be used to make the point.  
2
 Ada has been reading Field [2008], Beth has been reading Williamson [1998], though sheÕs clearly ignored his 
more recent writings on semantic paradoxes and abductive methodology, where he attacks the idea of logic as a 
Ôneutral arbiterÕ. 
 2 
 You are condemned from both sides. Beth and Ada agree that either rationality requires 
you to have full confidence in L ∨ ÂL or no confidence in it. They both regard your 0.5 
confidence as violating a rational requirement. And since your view is that one of them gets 
things right, you agree that your modest hedged attitude is irrational.  
 
2. How General Is the Problem? 
What this threatens to establish is: 
 
 (Rationally Required Extremism)  
 Either rationality requires me to have credence 1 in L ∨ ÂL, or it requires me to have 
 credence 0 in L ∨ ÂL.  
 
Your middling credence violates a rational requirement, if this claim is true. Since (ex hypothesi) 
you believe this claim, by your own lights your attitude is irrational.  
 That it is rationality that is in play here is crucial. Recommendations for extremism are 
quite common. Let's suppose that Ada and Beth disagree about some contingent matterÑ
Valentin's location. Ada thinks that he is in the kitchen; Beth thinks that he is in the garden. You 
think that one of them is correct but modestly hedge your attitude, having 0.5 credence in the 
kitchen option. Ada and Beth agree that one ought to have high credence in what's true and have 
low credence in what's false. Whence you accept: 
 
(Doxastic Ought Extremism)  
Either I ought to have high credence in Valentin being in the kitchen, or I ought to have 
low credence in Valentin being in the kitchen.  
 
Your middling credence in Valentin being in the kitchen is not the attitude you ought to have, 
according to both Ada and Beth. You trust their joint verdict, so by your own lights your attitude 
is not as it ought to be. But here, there is no puzzle. The sense of ÔoughtÕ in which you ought to 
believe what is true is an externalistic, evaluative one.
3
 We all (barring Descartes' pure inquirer) 
acknowledge that we are not believing exactly as we ought to, if truth irrespective of evidence is 
what sets the standards. We nevertheless maintain that our attitudes are the rational way to 
respond to the uncertainty we have about how we ought (in this external sense) to believe.  
 According to the picture that I work within, rationality provides the safety net norms that 
guide you in coping with uncertainty. Rational requirements are a matter of the proper internal 
patterning of your attitudes, not a matter of bringing them into correspondence with the world 
outside the mind.
4
 Uncertainty about how you (externally) ought to believe is grist to the mill.
5
 
Uncertainty about rationality is special. If you agree with Ada and Beth that rationality requires 
an extremal credence in L ∨ ÂL, you can't adopt a middling credence and present this as the 
rational way to respond to this uncertainty. For you have already conceded that rationality 
requires that you do not do this. You can no longer rely on the safety net to guide your attitudes 
                                                
3
 This classification of ÔoughtsÕ is drawn from Florian Steinberger [2016].  
4
 Believing as you ought to requires much more than being rational in the narrow sense, I assume. See Kolodny 
[2007] for an example of this separation of rationality and reasons for belief. 
5
 Compare uncertainty about how you morally-ought to behave given an ÔobjectiveÕ understanding of moral-ought in 
the minerÕs puzzle [Regan 1980; Jackson 1991]. For related discussion of subjective and objective oughts in the 
moral sphere see Rosen [2003], Smith and Jackson [2006], Harman [2011], and Sepielli [2013].  
 3 
and your further inquiry on the matter. If you knowingly adopted irrational attitudes in hedging 
your views on L ∨ ÂL, then you regard this attitude of yours as pathological; you should look for 
therapy rather than further evidence.  
 In sum: Ought Extremism in general is not by itself problematic, because in the general 
case we have rationality standing by to guide our responses to uncertainty about what to do or 
believe. But Rationally Required Extremism is problematic, because rationality can't guide you 
when the thing that you are uncertain about is what rationality's guidance is.  
 It is implausible that the modest, middling confidence you invest in L ∨ ÂL is a violation 
of a rational requirement. Indeed, given the balance of arguments, any other attitude seems 
unwarranted. I conclude that Rationally Required Extremism is false.  
 
3. Rationality without Logic  
My diagnosis is the following: Ada and Beth were wrong to hold that logic articulates 
requirements on rationality. It is not the case that you are rationally required to be fully confident 
of tautologies, to fully reject contradictions, and to preserve confidence over valid arguments. 
What is correct in the vicinity is the following: 
 
(Doxastic Logical Ought Extremism)  
Either (in light of the logical facts) I ought to have credence 1 in L ∨ ÂL, or (in light of the 
logical facts) I ought to have credence 0 in L ∨ ÂL.  
 
This has exactly the same pattern as the ÔextremismÕ about the correct attitude to have that 
derives from your uncertainty over Valentin's whereabouts. If this is all that logic gives us, we 
can still maintain that the rational response to our uncertainty about what the logical facts are is 
to have 0.5 confidence in L ∨ ÂL.  
 But we need to say more about what the rational constraints on belief are to be, if they're 
not ones that make appeal to logical facts. The idea of rationality as a safety net, guiding our 
responses to uncertainty, presupposes that there is some content to the guidance given. To defend 
rational illogicality requires spelling out what that guidance could be.  
 The agenda for the next few sections is as follows. I describe a familiar account of 
rational belief that incorporates logic in a way that would generate our original puzzle. I give 
what I regard as the best reason for thinking that the framework does generate rational 
requirements. Examining a dubious premise in that reasoning allows us to pinpoint a way of 
generalising the framework to allow for rational uncertainty about logic.  
 
4. Bayesianism and Logic 
Bayesians give a pleasingly concrete story about the rational requirements on beliefÑin 
particular, on partial belief.
6
 As a background, let's take it that our agents have degrees of belief 
in those structured propositions that they adopt doxastic attitudes towards. Ôp(A)Õ will denote the 
agentÕs degree of belief in A. The Bayesianism in question requires these degrees of belief to be 
probabilistic in the following sense: 
 
 (BayesianismÑStructural Version) 
                                                
6
 Bradley [2015] is a recent user-friendly introduction to the Bayesian canon.  
 4 
 p(A) = 1 whenever A is a tautology.  
 p(A) = 0 whenever A is inconsistent.  
 p(B) is no less than p(A) whenever B is a logical consequence of A.  
 p(A) + p(B) = p(C) whenever A and B are a logical partition of C.  
 
This represents a standard form of Bayesianism, when you understand the logical properties 
invoked in the orthodox, classical way.  
 Some caveats and clarifications. First, I'm taking degrees of belief to attach to structured 
entities rather than, e.g., sets of events. That's familiar but not universal in this setting. Normally 
the structured entities are taken to be sentences, but construing them as structured propositions 
makes no formal difference. Second, if we wish to allow that agents can fail to adopt an attitude 
to some proposition, we need only make a modest tweak to the above: the rational requirement 
will be that there be some mapping from propositions to numbers p*, coinciding with p where 
the latter is defined, such that p* meets the constraints above. The agentÕs partial beliefs must be 
extendable to a probability function over a closure of the propositions on which the agent takes a 
stance.
7
 Third, Bayesians differ about whether there are further rational constraints on belief over 
and above the ones mentioned, and most Bayesians supplement the static (beliefs-at-one-time) 
requirements above with dynamic (beliefs-over-time) requirements which concern how we 
update our credences upon learning new information. My discussion will be neutral on this front, 
focusing on the common core just identified. 
 If one favours a nonclassical logic, the characterization of Bayesianism just given still 
makes sense, though its content will be very different. Nonclassical Bayesianism has been 
explored in recent years by several authors.
8
 For present purposes, the important thing is that the 
core of Bayesianism doesn't require allegiance to classical logic. But if we articulate it as above, 
it does require some logic or other. For that reason, I will call all these theories of rationality 
Ôlogical probabilismsÕ.   
 The upshot is this. Ada declares allegiance to a particular nonclassical logic (perhaps the 
Strong Kleene Logic), and articulates the rational requirements on belief via the corresponding 
nonclassical Bayesianism.
9
 Beth declares allegiance to a classical logic, and so articulates the 
rational requirements on belief by her lights via standard classical Bayesianism. From the 
disjunction of these two ways of filling in the schematic version of Bayesianism above, we 
derive Rationally Required Extremism. A shared commitment to logical probabilism, therefore, 
produces our original puzzle.  
 
5. Accuracy and the Subject's Point of View 
There is extensive work in the Bayesian tradition that seeks to explain why probabilistic 
constraints should be taken to be rational requirements on belief. This will give guidance about 
how we might generalise the model to avoid our puzzle.  
                                                
7
 In the unstructured setting, this would be the algebraic closure; in the structured setting, closure under logical 
operations.  
8
 See Williams [2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2016]. Particularly central precedents are Field [2000] and Paris [2001].  
9
 Representing truth values as 1 (truth), 0 (falsity), and 0.5 (other), the Strong Kleene logic represents conjunction as 
minimum, disjunction as maximum, and negation as one minus negated value. An argument is valid iff it preserves 
value 1. See Williams [2016] for details and references.  
 5 
 The version of these results I like best is based on the accuracy arguments given by Jim 
Joyce [1998, 2009] and based ultimately on formal work by de Finetti [1974].
10
 The starting 
point is the idea that we can rank individual degrees of belief by how ÔaccurateÕ or Ôclose to the 
truthÕ they are. For example, if it's true that Valentin is in the kitchen, then you're closer to the 
truth, or more accurate, the more confident you are in that very proposition. By aggregating this 
measure of accuracy over all the attitudes you adopt, we reach an overall evaluation of how 
accurate a belief state is, relative to a given possible world.  
 We then prove the following: if B (a function from propositions to real numbers) is 
improbabilistic, then thereÕs an alternative function B*, such that for each w, B* is overall closer 
to the truth than B at w. So violating one of the constraints that we listed earlier means that you 
will be gratuitously inaccurate. There's an alternative set of attitudes you could have adopted that 
is guaranteed to bring you closer to the truth.  
 There's a lot to be said about this. For example: what exactly must accuracy be like, in 
order to be able to prove the result quoted?
11
 But my interest is in the sort of grounding for 
rational requirements being offered here.  
 Here is the way I see that issue. We start with an externalistic, evaluative normÑthat we 
ought to be as accurate as possible. That's comparable to an externalistic, evaluative norm such 
as: we ought to perform acts that in fact produce the most good. So in particular, when belief 
state B is overall more accurate than belief state B*, an agent z ought to believe B rather than B* 
(a contrastive verdict: given just those two options, B is the one to go for).  
 The comparative accuracy norm is exactly the kind of external norm that we know we're 
going to violate all the time. When Valentin is in the kitchen, the maximally accurate overall 
belief state will have me being fully confident in this. When heÕs not, the maximally accurate 
belief state involves full rejection of the same thing. I am certain one of these is the case. But 
lacking appropriate evidence I am 0.5 confident in this claim.  
 To get something that is attitude-guiding, we need to somehow introduce the subject's 
evidentially limited point of view. And the minimal way of doing this, I think, is that when the 
condition in question (for example, B being more accurate than B*, or act X producing more 
good than act Y) is by the subject's own lights met, then the subject really should be doing as the 
external norm recommends. 
 So the general pattern for ÔsubjectivisingÕ external evaluative norms would be the 
following: 
 
From Evaluative to Derivative Deontic Claims: 
z ought X rather than Y when C(X,Y) 
z should X rather than Y when, for z, it must be that C(X,Y).
12
 
 
In the special case of maximizing the good we get: 
 
                                                
10
 For discussion of analogous results using Dutch Books, see Williams [2012b].  
11
 Pettigrew [2016] is a state of the art book-length discussion.  
12
 The structure (and the switch between two deontic modals to mark it) is inspired by Williamson's discussion of the 
knowledge norm for assertion and belief in Knowledge and its Limits [2000], and its subjectivisation.  My version 
appeals to doxastic necessity (ÔmustÕ), rather than belief. Consider: I believe that pressing the button will get goodies 
at no cost to anyone. But itÕs possible by my lights that pressing brings despair and destruction. With appropriate 
credences, and sufficient despair, the thing I should do is not press. Unless belief excludes such doubt, the resulting 
principles will not be plausible.  
 6 
z ought perform A rather than A* when A brings about better outcomes than A*. 
z should perform A rather than A* when, for z, it must be that A brings about better 
outcomes than A*.  
 
The subjectivised norm here represents a rather plausible dominance constraint on choice: when 
A is better than A* on every doxastic possibility, go for A! 
 In the case of accuracy, we get: 
 
z ought have belief state B rather than B*, when B is more accurate than B* 
z should have belief state B rather than B* when, for z, it must be that B is more accurate 
than B* 
  
In the case of the evaluative/external norm of accuracy, the "subjectivised" version is a 
requirement to avoid a certain kind of accuracy-domination.  
 Not every subjectivisation of an external norm is a rational requirement. The claim that a 
given subjectivised norm (the one resulting from subjectivising accuracy) is a rational 
requirement I see as a theoretical identification, based on inspecting that norm and seeing that it 
is suited to play the rationality role, that is, that this norm will play the safety net role better than 
any competitor.  
 The above strategy, if it works, illuminates why certain conditions (anti-subjective-
dominance constraints, in effect) have normative punchÑwhy they are not just arbitrary rules 
defining membership of some club, but rather are intelligibly connected to the underlying values. 
Whether this connection is strong enough to really explain the normativity of the resulting rules 
is a nice question, and one pressed by Kolodny [2007] and Broome [2005] et al. in their work on 
reasons to be rational. But that the normatively binding rules are normatively binding rational 
requirements is a classificatory question orthogonal to whether they have normative force. On 
this point, more later.  
 
6. Logical Versus Doxastic Possibilities 
Take as a working primitive the notion of an agentÕs doxastic space, the set of worlds that are 
doxastically possible for her. Assume the following:  
 
 For z, it must be that p iff p is true at each w doxastically possible for z.
13
  
 
This allows us to pinpoint a lacuna in the accuracy argument for probabilism just sketched. If 
one violates classical probabilistic constraints on belief, then there's some alternative belief state 
C that across all logical possibilities is more accurate than your starting point B. But the 
subjectivised version of the accuracy norm requires that we show that for the agent, it must be 
that C is more accurate than B. Unless we can assume that the doxastic possibilities are a subset 
of the logical possibilities, this does not follow.  
 In previous work [Williams 2012a] I extended accuracy arguments to the nonclassical 
case. But the same point goes through. The formal results I appealed to showed, for instance, that 
                                                
13
 A world here is simply an arbitrary function from propositions to truth values. Characterizing the relation between 
doxastic possibilities (and the connected ÔmightsÕ and ÔmustsÕ) and other notions (belief, knowledge, certainty) is a 
matter of substantive theory, not definitional analysis (though the principle that if z is certain that p, then for z, it 
must be that p, is very plausible).  
 7 
if one violates nonclassical (say, Strong Kleene-based) probabilistic constraints on belief, then 
there's some alternative belief state that across all Strong Kleene possibilities is more accurate 
than your starting point. But that shows that the agent violates the subjectivised version of the 
accuracy norm only if the doxastic possibilities for the agent are a subset of the Strong Kleene 
possibilities.  
 Consider your plight when trying to hedge between Ada and Beth, and getting shouted at 
by both. You took the world-according-to-Ada as a doxastic possibility, and the world-
according-to-Beth as another. But the world-according-to-Ada is a nonclassical possibility, so 
your doxastic possibilities are wider than the classical possibilities (even if the actual world is 
itself as classical as you like). Something analogous happens in reverse. The world-according-to-
Beth contains a violation of the T-scheme, and since it is a doxastic possibility, your doxastic 
space is wider than Ada's nonclassical logical possibilities.  
 I conclude that the accuracy argument for probabilism is flawed if the target is any one of 
the variants of logical probabilism. The reason for this is independent of worries about whether 
logical probabilism is fit to play the safety net rationality role. The reason is rather that in order 
to use the accuracy argument to underpin probabilism as a constraint whose normative punch is 
inherited from the evaluative norm of accuracy we need to have some independent case that 
doxastic possibilities can't outstrip the logical possibilities. Prima facie, the needed extra premise 
is simply false, so the accuracy argument for probabilism fails.  
 
7. Doxastic Probabilism  
The accuracy argument for probabilism is flawed if it targets a logical probabilism. But it can 
support a different form of probabilism.  
 The general result on which accuracy arguments (and Dutch Book arguments, for that 
matter) rest is that if oneÕs distribution of degrees of belief over propositions fails to take a 
particular formÑif they arenÕt representable as expectations of the truth value of each 
proposition, relative to some underlying division of belief over possibilitiesÑthen bad things 
happen. In the case of accuracy, the bad thing that happens is that oneÕs belief state will be 
accuracy-dominated by some alternative belief state across the underlying space of 
possibilities.
14
  
 To get the logical forms of probabilism, one needs to assume that the underlying space of 
possibilities contains all and only the logical possibilities. But I have argued that, to be 
philosophically cogent, the argument needed to start with a potentially wider spaceÑthe doxastic 
possibilities.  
 Logical probabilism is a thesis that concerns rational requirements on a single type of 
doxastic stateÑpartial belief across propositions. But the true rational constraints, I contend, 
govern the agentÕs partial beliefs together with their modal attitudes---what is possible and 
impossible by their lights. Doxastic probabilism, as I will call it, requires that partial beliefs are 
representable as expectations of the truth value of each proposition, relative to some underlying 
assignment of credence (summing to credence 1) over the doxastic possibilities. The result of 
violating the constraints of doxastic probabilism will be accuracy-domination relative to the 
space of doxastic possibilities. This is exactly the condition that a subjectivised accuracy norm 
tells us to avoid. 
                                                
14
 In the case of Dutch Books, the bad thing is a loss of money on a particular book of bets in each possibility in the 
underlying space. 
 8 
 The resulting constraints are still recognizably probabilistic. For example, if you regard w 
and u as the only two open possibilities, and p is true at w but not u, and q at u but not w, then if 
your beliefs are to be doxastically probabilistic, your degree of belief in p and q separately must 
sum to 1. (More generally, the function that describes your degrees of belief must be a convex 
combination of the functions that pick out the truth values of propositions at each world in your 
doxastic space, that is: if t(X,w) is the truth value of X at w, then there are constants �∀ summing 
to 1, such that for any A,  � � = �∀�(�, �)∀ ).
15
 However, probabilistic constraints in this 
sense do not incorporate any logic.
16
 
 Doxastic probabilism is my answer to the central challenge for illogical rationality 
specified aboveÑthat of saying something substantive about what rationality requires, if we are 
not required to respect the true logic. In the following section, I illustrate this substance further.  
 
8. Recognition Requirements and Conditionalized Norms 
I set up the initial puzzle by assuming that the rational requirements allegedly associated with 
logic take an austere form. When C follows from A, itÕs required that you not have lower 
credence in C than in A. Austere formulations like this contrast with looser ÔrecognitionÕ 
requirements on which the constraint on oneÕs doxastic state only kicks in when (in some sense) 
you recognise or should recognise the logical fact in question. In Hartry FieldÕs [2009] 
formulation, the constraints only kick in when itÕs obvious that C follows from A. In some of the 
formulations MacFarlane [2004] considers, the recognition element is that the subject knows the 
relevant logical property obtains. 
 Now recall your plight when attempting to hedge between the views of Ada and Beth. 
You are genuinely unsure whether L ∨ ÂL is a tautology. ItÕs not obvious that it is; even if in fact 
it is a logical truth, you arenÕt in an epistemic position to know it. So even if Beth is correct that 
it is a tautology, if we work with recognition requirements rather than austere requirements, all 
acknowledge that you are not required to fully believe L ∨ ÂL. Likewise, you are genuinely 
unsure whether L & ÂL follows from L ∨ ÂL (and youÕre not obviously wrong in being so). So 
even if Ada is correct that it does, if we work with recognition requirements, all acknowledge 
that they do not bind you to fully reject L ∨ ÂL. On the recognition requirement formulations, 
neither Ada nor Beth will condemn you for your agnosticism over L ∨ ÂL. Some might present 
this as an adequate response to the initial puzzle, avoiding the need develop new forms of 
probabilism.  
 I want to make two points in response. The first will be that the best recognition 
requirement proposal is a special case of doxastic probabilism. The second will be that the full 
elaboration in doxastic probabilism is necessary, because the sort of piggy-backing specification 
given above only captures a fraction of the relevant rational requirements. 
 Now, the kind of recognition involved in plausible probabilistic recognition norms is 
going to be highly constrained. After all, it had better be that when you recognise that A is a 
tautology, you have degree of belief 1 that A; analogously for the recognition of consequences 
and contradictions. If you think that believing or knowing that A is a tautology is rationally 
                                                
15
 Some Bayesians are committed to no more than this, and were always happy to include Ôlogically impossibleÕ 
worlds in their underlying state space. Easwaran [2014] is one recent example.  
16
 Caveat: in order that Òconvex combinationsÓ of worlds may be defined in the usual sense, the truth values 
assigned to propositions need to be real-valued. See Williams [2016] for discussion.  
 9 
compatible with not believing to degree 1 that A, then you cannot identify Ôrecognizing that AÕ, 
in the sense in which it appears in the formulation of the norms, with these familiar attitudes.  
 ÔRecognising that A is a tautologyÕ in the relevant sense, I suggest, entails that the subject 
is not doxastically open to any possibility on which A is not true. Likewise, when z recognises 
that C follows from A, x is not doxastically open to any possibility on which A is true and C is 
untrue; when z recognises that A is a contradiction, z is not doxastically open to any possibility 
on which A is true.
17
 Perhaps recognition requires more than doxastic certainty in the sense just 
articulated, but it is at least as strong. 
 Compare this to the norms that doxastic probabilism predicts. For example, suppose an 
agent recognises that C follows from A. IÕve said that this entails that the agent has no doxastic 
possibility where A is true and C is untrue. But given doxastic probabilism, the agentÕs credences 
are constrained to be a probability function over her doxastic space, and so she will violate a 
rational requirement unless all credence devoted to worlds where A is true is credence devoted to 
worlds where C is true. Restating: she will violate a rational requirement unless the credence she 
devotes to C is at least as high as the credence she devotes to A. But that is the rational 
requirement the recognition norm was afterÑand it is predicted by doxastic probabilism plus the 
thesis that recognition (in the relevant sense) entails doxastic certainty. This observation 
generalises. Recognition norms are explained and predicted by doxastic probabilism.
18
  
 On the other hand, recognition requirements do not entail doxastic probabilism. First, 
there may be more to recognition than doxastic certainty: we might be doxastically certain that A 
is a tautology, even if A isnÕt obviously a tautology (maybe the proof took a long time, or 
perhaps was carried out by a friend or machine in whom we have complete confidence) and 
when we lack knowledge that A is a tautology (because weÕre convinced of it on the basis of a 
false logical theory, or have some false lemma in our reasoning, etc.). Second, recognition norms 
kick in only when weÕre doxastically certain of some fact, but these are just limit cases for 
doxastic probabilism. The latter but not the former continues to apply under conditions of logical 
uncertainty.    
 As a result, recognition norms alone undergenerate rational requirements. We saw that 
accuracy-dominance considerations afford an argument that one should conform to probabilistic 
norms whether or not oneÕs doxastic space embodies knowledge of the correct logic, or whether 
the doxastic space is based only upon what is obvious. Especially when thinking of rational 
requirements as a matter of the proper internal patterning of mental states, I canÕt see why one 
would deny that doxastic certainty alone is sufficient to generate rational requirements---some 
specific consideration that the requirement lapses in the absence of extra factor X would be 
needed.  
 But the strongest case for going beyond recognition norms is their inability to handle 
cases of uncertainty. To illustrate, suppose that modus ponens is in fact valid for the English 
indicative conditional. But Vann McGee [1985] presents some prima facie plausible 
counterexamples (under our assumption, heÕs made a subtle mistake in concluding that they 
really are counterexamples). After reading the last few years of work on the semantics for 
conditionals, Sally has a good sense of what the truth values for the relevant propositions would 
be like, if McGee were right. SheÕs pretty confident (to degree 0.8) that heÕs wrong, a level of 
                                                
17
 To cover nonclassical cases, these principles need careful formulation, but appropriate formulations are available.  
18
 In FieldÕs [2009] version of recognition requirements, we will appeal to a normative entailment between 
obviousness and doxastic certainty, rather than a strict entailment. It is still doxastic probabilism that it is doing the 
heavy lifting.   
 10 
confidence too low to count as recognizing the validity of the ruleÑitÕs certainly doxastically 
possible for her that modus ponens fails.  
 
Suppose Sally is certain that A, but only 50/50 in C. She then becomes convinced that if A then C 
is true. Unless she adjusts her other beliefs (in A, C) or acceptances (0.8 in modus ponens), I take 
it that thereÕs a clear violation of rationality in her attitudes. Her attitude to modus ponens means 
that she must, to degree at least 0.8, believe C conditional on things in which she is certain. The 
small uncertainty could excuse her being 0.8 in C, but thereÕs no room for her to drop to 0.5. 
Theories of rational requirements need to account for the datum that SallyÕs attitudes are not 
rational. However, if all we had to go on were recognition norms, then we couldnÕt say why this 
would be. By construction Sally does not recognise the validity of modus ponensÑher level of 
confidence is not high enough. So the triggering condition of the modus ponens recognition 
requirement isnÕt met.  
 Doxastic probabilism explains what goes wrong here. Let L be the set of worlds that 
cohere with a certain set of logical principlesÑfor definiteness let them be the classical logical 
possibilities, with the indicative conditional interpreted as material conditional. Relative to L 
(and its subspaces) the doxastic probabilistic requirements include standard classical logical 
probabilism. This has relevance even to someone like Sally who only has 0.8 credence that some 
world in L is actual, because those classical probabilistic constraints constrain SallyÕs conditional 
credences, in particular, her conditional belief in beliefs that such-and-such is the case under the 
supposition L.
19
 For example, SallyÕs credence in A given L, and in ÂA given L, must sum to 1. 
Essentially, that section of her belief state which she devotes to classical possibilities must 
behave like a classical probability.  Further, there are doxastic probabilistic norms that constrain 
the relation between a subjectÕs categorical belief in a proposition A and their conditional 
credences in A given L. SallyÕs categorical beliefs reported above mean that, on pain of violating 
doxastic probabilismÕs requirements, she will have degree of belief 1 in A given L and the same 
degree of belief in if A then C given L. On the other hand she can be no more than than 0.625 
confident in C given L, given she is only 0.5 confident in C unconditionally. That pattern of 
beliefs violates the classical probabilistic norms on SallyÕs degrees of belief under the 
supposition that classical logic holdsÑand as argued above, this is a violation of a rational 
requirement of doxastic probabilism. 
 Doxastic probabilism doesnÕt just deliver recognition norms. It delivers unconditional 
norms (the old logical norms, in fact) on certain two-place attitudes, the agentÕs conditional 
credences. Since it also underpins a general analogue of the law of total probability connecting 
categorical and conditional belief, this constrains how agents who are uncertain about logic 
divide their belief over those very issues they are uncertain about. This is the phenomenon that 
underpins the application of doxastic probabilism to the McGee case, but it is entirely general. 
Recognition norms alone fall silent when we are not doxastically certain of the logical facts; but 
that means that are silent most of the time. They should be viewed as stepping stones, subsumed 
in the more general account presented here. 
 
9. Incomplete Subjectivisation 
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 The rational conditional belief in A given L will match the conditional probability of A given L. That is, it equals 
the total credence invested in L-worlds in which A obtains, normalised by the total credence invested in L-worlds.  
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The last two sections address worries about my case for doxastic probabilism. In this section I 
consider whether the account is undercut by failures of epistemic transparency. In the next, I will 
consider whether it is subject to ÔrevengeÕ puzzles.  
 Recall that probabilism is a constraint that results from subjectivising the external 
evaluative accuracy norm. The pattern was as follows: 
 
z ought X rather than Y when C(X,Y) 
z should X rather than Y when, for z, it must be that C(X,Y). 
 
The agent is irrational, I suggested, when a belief state other than her own is more accurate at 
every one of the doxastic possibilitiesÑand in virtue of instantiating the above schema, she 
should not be in irrational states.  
 Doxastic irrationality has normative force in virtue of being a subjectivisation of the 
objective demand for accuracy. But the subjectivisation is not totalÑin particular, thereÕs no 
guarantee that an agent who is irrational will be in a position to recognise this fact. Let me chart 
some ways in which this can arise.  
 Firstly, thereÕs nothing in the above scheme that requires the agent to appreciate the 
normative significance of C, in order for the external or subjectivised rules to be in place. 
Imagine an agent who thought that the external evaluative norm for degrees of belief was their 
conduciveness to making money, rather than accuracy. They might deny that thereÕs anything 
normatively defective about an (accuracy-dominated) set of beliefs they hold, simply because 
they regard accuracy domination (as opposed to financial domination) as irrelevant.  
 Secondly, an irrational agent may lack introspective access to the facts that make them 
irrational. An agent might appreciate that beliefs B accuracy-dominated beliefs B* across 
possibilities D, and fail to recognise that they themselves believe B* and are open to D. 
 Thirdly, an irrational agent might have a fix on their own beliefs and value accuracy, and 
not be in a position to justifiably work out that thereÕs something defective with her beliefs. 
Cognitive limitations are the boring way this can happen, but more interestingly, the agent may 
not be able to work it out even in principle. The proof that there is an accuracy-dominating belief 
state B for each improbabilistic starting state B* is nonconstructive.
20
 Suppose that classical 
logic is in fact correct, but that Sally is open to both intuitionistic and classical varieties of 
mathematicsÑher doxastic space features both kinds of possibility. It may be true that B 
accuracy-dominates B* across SallyÕs belief space (we can suppose B meets intuitionistic 
probabilistic constraints, but B* violates them). Yet thereÕs no guarantee that she is in a position 
to figure out that this is the case, or even to see that there is any such B*Ñ the proof that allows 
us to see this is a non-constructive one that she regards as dubious.  
 Sally doesnÕt seem to do anything wrong if she has belief state B*, when sheÕs not in a 
position to come to justifiably believe that it is accuracy dominated across her doxastic space. By 
her own lights her pattern of mental states is in order. Sure, her values may be out of line with 
the true epistemic norms; her beliefs about her beliefs may be out of line with the facts, or the 
methods of proof she accepts out of line with the truly valid methods of proof. But such lack of 
alignment to correct opinion appears to be the external evaluations that generated the 
unproblematic extremisms in the initial section. The charge of irrationality was distinctively 
supposed to concern internal patterning of mental states, not matching up to external standards.  
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 The non-constructivity enters, for example, with an appeal to BrouwerÕs fixed point theorem. 
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 Further: if we are open to incorporating external standards into our theory of irrationality 
at the end of the day, why not do so at right at the beginning, and convict (say) Ada and the one 
who is agnostic between Ada and Beth of irrationality, while being careful to emphasise that this 
does not bring with it a charge that she has messed up by her own lights?  
 These challenges raise questions about the point of having a theory of rationality in the 
first place. My view is the following: rational agents are those who can, and have reason to, use a 
certain set of tools for dealing with uncertainty, for extending their beliefs to previously 
unconsidered cases, for updating on new information, for deciding what to do, and so forth.  
 To illustrate: why is it crazy to take nomically necessarily false beliefs to be ipso facto 
irrational? Not because such beliefs are flawlessÑafter all theyÕre inaccurate! ItÕs because our 
standard tools for handling uncertainty and inquiry into contingent matters (e.g. whether the 
trains are on time on this line) extend in the same way to handling uncertainty and inquiry into 
whether water is or is not H2O, or whether things of equal mass accelerate under gravity at the 
same rate. You could of course label those who are anything other than certain of nomic 
necessities ÔirrationalÕ, but this would deprive the category of interest from the point of view of 
the appropriate epistemic structures.  
 The same goes, I contend, for the proposal to take logically necessarily false beliefs to be 
ipso facto irrational. One who hedges on whether L ∨ ÂL seems prima facie rational because 
there seems no obstacle to her treating the case just as she does uncertainty over ordinary 
contingent or merely nomically necessary questions . She is reacting to the conflict in testimony 
between Ada and Beth just in the same old familiar way she reacts to other conflicts in 
testimony. Appearances could of course be deceptive: it might be that under examination it turns 
out that the standard (probabilistic) tools we use to handle ordinary uncertainty have no 
extension to this case. But doxastic probabilism vindicates the initial seemings hereÑit shows us 
how a standard suite of tools (probabilistic synchronic norms on belief, conditionalisation as a 
means of updating, standard rational choice) are generalised to cover the case.
21
 So the 
theoretical joints cut at doxastic probabilism, not at logical probabilism. ThatÕs the principled 
case for marking the boundary as I do. It does not rely on a commitment to any kind of access-
internalism about rationality.  
 The first challenge was to say why it is that, if Sally doesnÕt appreciate that sheÕs messed 
up, we should classify her as irrational. I say: because if her attitudes do not fall into the right 
pattern, then she canÕt use the usual tools for dealing with uncertainty. ThatÕs a fact about her, 
whether she appreciates it or not. The second challenge is to say why we couldnÕt play this card 
earlier. I say: one could do so, but it would be a mere terminological victory. We would need a 
new term, rationality*, to mark the limits of applicability of the usual tools for dealing with 
uncertainty.  
 
10. Revenge? 
I started by considered two characters, Ada and Beth, who adopted two different positions on the 
rationally required credence in a certain proposition. That gave us Rationally Required 
Extremism, which was unacceptable. Doxastic probabilism dissolves that worry. But now IÕve 
given some substance to doxastic probabilism, canÕt we find some other matter for Ada and Beth 
to disagree about, which will manifest in a disagreement about whether to go along with what 
doxastic probabilism requires, or to adopt some other attitude? (i) A ÔhedgedÕ attitude between 
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 The resources are to be found in [Williams 2016].   
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the recommended positions will not be rational, by the lights of doxastic probabilism; but (ii) it 
will be intuitively rational, manifesting an admirable modesty in the presence of serious 
theoretical disagreement. This is a template for a revenge puzzle. But I have been unable to find 
compelling instances of this template. Perhaps the reader can do better: in this section I forewarn 
them of slips it is easy to make.  
 To fix ideas, suppose Chara is a doxastic probabilist, whereas Diana believes in some 
appropriately general form of Dempster-Shafer belief function theory. When both agree that 
there is no relevant evidence for or against a particular proposition, say, whether Valentin is in 
the kitchen, V. Chara regards an attitude of 0.5 confidence as rationally required, or at least will 
insist that our confidences in this proposition and its negation sum to 1; whereas Diana will say 
that in the acknowledged absence of evidence we should invest no confidence in this proposition, 
and none in its negation.
 22
  
 Chara and Diana certainly disagree on epistemological theory; and certainly it seems 
rational, in the right evidential circumstances, to hedge between them on the question of what 
norms are in force. But this is not an instance of the puzzle, because no case has been made for 
(i). Doxastic probabilism requires we divide credence in a particular way among whatever 
doxastic possibilities we are open to. Derivatively, it requires we divide credence appropriately 
among propositions true at such possibilities. However, it does not constrain what propositions 
(normative or non-normative) are true at a doxastic possibility. So if the normative proposition 
that doxastic probabilism fails (DP) is true at a world that is possible for you, you can 
simultaneously be doing what DP requires and yet be doubting DP itself. In sum: doxastic 
probabilism does not rule out rational doubt over doxastic probabilism. (Perhaps a critic will see 
this very feature as objectionable, but that would be a whole different line of attack, and an 
attack on a feature that generalised probabilism shares with logical probabilism).   
 Perhaps Chara and Diana also adopt different attitudes to the proposition V. Chara has a 
0.5 credence; Diana, one might think, adopts the distinctive Dempster-Shafer attitude: degree of 
belief 0 in V, and the same in ÂV. The cautious agent wishes to hedge between themÑat any 
rate, do something other than immediately side with Chara against Diana. But assuming Chara is 
correct about what doxastic probabilism requires, that would be to be irrational.  
 I say that Ôone might thinkÕ that Diana possessed the distinctive Dempster-Shafer attitude 
to V. But that is contentious. Probabilists and Dempster-Shafer theorists donÕt disagree only 
about normative constraints on attitudes, they differ on the space of available attitudes itself. For 
probabilists, to have degree of belief 0 in a proposition is always a way of rejecting it; the 
Dempster-Shafer theorist thinks it can be a way of being uncertain. One or other is wrong. Either 
way, Chara and Diana can share a common psychological attitude to VÑutter uncertaintyÑyet 
sincerely report themselves in different ways, as a reflex of their overarching theoretical 
disagreement. Hedging on V itself is not called for, since (whoeverÕs right) they do not take 
different attitudes in the first place. 
 The original Ada-Beth case raised no such complexities, since it worked with a common 
space of point-like credal states, with two normative theories of the rational patterning of the 
mutually recognised attitude. 
 I have been unable to find a convincing revenge puzzle. Perhaps none exists. But suppose 
that we could find such an instance. Would we be entitled to conclude that doxastic probabilism 
is false? No: no more than we could conclude that logical probabilism was false, simply by 
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 The case is personally pressing for me: the two approaches to attitudes to indeterminate survival developed 
[Williams 2014a, 2014b] respectively instantiate an analogue of the Chara-Diana situation.  
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inspection of the original Ada/Beth case. The case against logical probabilism that has been 
given in this paper was not the provision of a single counterintuitive consequence (philosophers 
are skilled at biting bullets). The case against logical probabilism is that there is a rivalÑ
generalised probabilismÑthat subsumes its successes, has a principled motivation, and also 
gives a more satisfying account of case from which we started. Even if the elusive revenge 
puzzle could be found, the verdict on generalised probabilism would await the provision of a 
more general rival theory.  
 
11. Conclusion  
Doxastic probabilism articulates the rational constraints on partial belief and doxastic possibility. 
Logic has no special role, though it usefully spells out general and tractable constraints doxastic 
probabilism places on interesting kinds of conditional credences. The account has substance; for 
example, it tells us about the rational constraints on those who are almost but not quite accept 
modus ponens, when they believe that p and that q if p. It subsumes and goes beyond 
Ôrecognition normsÕ that might be used to evade the puzzle cases. Finally, IÕve argued that 
thereÕs a principled methodology underlying our discussions, and that we have as yet no reason 
to think it is threatened by revenge puzzles.
23
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